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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Jordan Wright appeals from his judgment of conviction for second 
degree murder. He asserts that the district court erred by refusing to permit an expert 
witness to testify regarding the reliability of eye witness identification, by refusing a jury 
instruction regarding the reliability of eye witness identification, and by imposing an 
excessive sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincls 
On May 22, 2006, Preston James "P.J." Gilmer was shot several times near the 
corner of Sixth and Grove Streets in Boise. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Ron Hohowski heard the gunshots from a tattoo parlor near 
Sixth and Front Street. (Tr., p.165, Ls.14-17.) He stepped outside and saw an African- 
American male who was wearing jeans and a white t-shirt; he smelled a "strong odor of 
gunpowder" and believed that this man may have been the individual responsible for the 
shooting. (Tr., p.167, L.l - p.169, L.14.) The man reached into his pocket "but 
something must have jabbed him or there was a quick action to where he - like he said 
ouch or moved his arm away." (Tr., p. 171, L.20 - p. 172, L. 1 .) Mr. Hohowski speculated 
that this individual may have had a gun in his pocket. (Tr., p.172, Ls.5-8.) 
This individual, who turned out to be Ernest Hames, was subsequently found by 
the Boise Police. (Tr., p.200, Ls.13-14.) Mr. James testified that his cousin, David 
Martin, Jr., was killed "on New Year's of 2004, 2005 and that Mr. Wright was a friend of 
his cousin. (Tr., p.292, Ls.13-24.) Laurence Weed was charged in relation to the killing 
of Mr. Martin. (Tr., p.529, Ls.23-29.) Mr. Weed and Mr. Gilmer were friends. 
(Tr., p.530, Ls.8-12.) 
Mr. James testified that on the evening in question, he, his girlfriend, Georgette 
Waldham, and Mr. Wright drove into downtown Boise. (Tr., p.295, Ls.1-14.) They 
parked in the lot behind the Diggy Bass bar. (Tr., p.295, Ls.24-25.) The three of them 
went to the China Blue bar; Mr. James had four or five drinks. (Tr., p.297, Ls.4-20.) 
According to Mr. James, he and Mr. Wright left the bar to go purchase cigarettes. 
(Tr., p.298, Ls.21-23.) Mr. James testified that on the way to the convenience store, he 
and Mr. Wright encountered Mr. Gilmer in front of the Diggy Bass bar. (Tr., p.300, Ls.3- 
6.) Mr. James claimed that he walked just ahead of Mr. Wright and Mr. Gilmer and then 
heard gunshots; he turned around and saw Mr. Wright running down the alley. 
(Tr., p.303, L.22 - p.305, L.5.) According to Mr. James, he just kept walking to the 
convenience store. (Tr., p.305, Ls.20-22.) Mr. James testified that he was not "sure" 
that he initially told the police that he was with Mr. Wright, but stated that he eventually 
told them about Mr. Wright. (Tr., p.307, Ls.7-12.) 
Annie Prescott testified that she was downtown with Mr. Gilmer that evening and 
that just as she was heading downstairs to the Diggy Bass bar, Mr. James and 
Mr. Wright exited China Blue and came their way. (Tr., p.518, Ls.18-23.) According to 
Ms. Prescott, Mr. Gilmer asked Mr. James and Mr. Wright if they could get him some 
cigars. (Tr., p.519, Ls.17-19.) Ms. Prescott proceeded downstairs into the bar but 
Mr. Gilmer did not follow her. (Tr., p.520, Ls.10-13.) 
Kyle Russell was also downtown drinking that evening. (Tr., p.595, Ls.12-13.) 
He had consumed "four or five Coors Light bottles," and "got a nice buzz, but I wasn't 
drunk." (Tr., p.595, Ls.20-23.) At approximately 1:30 a.m., he was in the Diggy Bass 
bar and "went outside to grab something to eat at a taco stand." (Tr., p.595, Ls.24-25.) 
He testified that after he purchased his food, he saw three men walking down the 
sidewalk together. (Tr., p.599, Ls.3-4.) He recognized one of them from the bar. 
(Tr., p.599, Ls.8-9.) However, no other witness testified that any of the three men ever 
entered the Diggy Bass bar that evening. He heard one of the men ask, "hey, hook me 
up with some buds for my blunt"; this caught his attention as he believed he was about 
to witness a drug transaction. (Tr., p.600, Ls.13-18.) One of the men responded, "I've 
got your buds right here." (Tr., p.604, Ls.5-8.) The man then reached into his coat 
pocket, pulled out a gun, and shot Mr. Gilmer. (Tr., p.604, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Russell 
described the shooter as "wearing a black and red jacket, was wearing black longer 
shorts, almost pants, the baggy ones, and he was wearing a black hat, black and red 
hat, and he had cornrows wiry out." (Tr., p.608, Ls.2-5.) 
Mr. Russell testified that he made a positive identification of Mr. Wright on the 
evening of the incident; however, the truth is that on that evening, he signed a 
document indicating that he had viewed a photo lineup and could not make an 
identification from the photographs. (Tr., p.620, L.6 - p.621, L.2.) Mr. Russell insisted 
that he told the detectives that if he was shown a "side shot" rather a "frontal view" he 
would be able to make an identification because he never saw the shooter face him; he 
only saw his profile. (Tr., p.621, Ls.1-1 I .) The detective confirmed that Mr. Russell did 
not Mr. Wright as the shooter on the evening of the incident. (Tr., p.669, Ls.20-24.) 
On December 7, 2005, Mr. Russell was shown another lineup with "side shots," 
identified Mr. Wright, and stated that he was "100 percent confident" with this 
identification. (Tr., p.622, Ls.3-19.) 
Mr. Wright was charged with first degree murder and was found guilty of second 
degree murder. (R., pp.51, 235.) Prior to trial, the State moved to exclude any 
testimony from Roy Malpass, Ph.D., Mr. Wright's proposed expert witness on the 
reliability of eyewitness identification. Following a hearing in which Dr. Malpass 
testified, the court excluded his testimony. (R., p.160.) Mr. Wright also requested a jury 
instruction on the reliability of eye witness testimony. (See Defendant's Request for 
Additional Jury Instructions Regarding Eyewitness Identification.) The court refused to 
issue the instruction to the jury. (Tr., p.760, Ls.1-11.) Following the conviction, the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with sixty years determinate. 
(R., p.240.) Mr. Wright appealed. (R., p.244.) He asserts that the district court erred by 
excluding Dr. Malpass's testimony, by failing to give the requested jury instruction, and 
by imposing an excessive sentence. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of 
Dr. Malpass regarding eyewitness reliability? 
2. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on the factors it could 
consider in evaluating eyewitness testimony? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence 
of life, with sixty years fixed, upon Mr. Wright following his conviction for 
second degree murder? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Excluding Testimony From Dr. Malpass Reqardinq The 
Reliability Of Eyewitness ldentification 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wright asserts that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the 
testimony of his proposed expert witness, Dr. Roy Malpass, Ph.D. 
B. The District Court Erred By Excludinq Testimony From Dr. Malpass Reqardinq 
The Reliability of Eyewitness ldentification 
The decision whether to permit or exclude expert witness testimony is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Winn, 121 ldaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 
(1992); State v. Crea, 119 ldaho 352, 355, 806 P.2d 445, 448 (1991); State v. Hopkins, 
113 ldaho 679, 747 P.2d 88 (1987); State v. Lawrence, 112 ldaho 149, 730 P.2d 1069 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Sfate V. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989) (citing Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 ldaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
"The issue of the admissibility of expert witness testimony on the reliability of 
memory and perception is an area of some controversy and question under our rules of 
evidence." State v. Pacheco, 134 ldaho 367, 371, 2 P.3d 752, 756 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(citing State v. Hoisington, 104 ldaho 153, 165, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (1983) (a case decided 
prior to the adoption of the ldaho Rules of Evidence in which the ldaho Supreme Court 
ruled that the trustworthiness of eyewitness observations is not beyond the ken of the 
jurors and thus found no error in the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. 
Loftus, a nationally renowned expert in the field, whose opinions would have concerned 
the reliability of eye witness identification), and State v. Alger, 115 ldaho 42, 50-51, 764 
P.2d 119, 127-28 (Ct. App. 1988) (suggesting that findings of social science experts' 
research which provide insight into the reliability of eyewitness identification may be of 
assistance to the jury in particular cases)). In Pacheco, the Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that, "in appropriate circumstances such testimony [the reliability of 
eyewitness identification], properly circumscribed, may be of assistance to the jury 
regarding eyewitness identification and the factors to be considered in determining the 
accuracy of such identification." Id., 134 ldaho at 371 n.2, 2 P.3d at 756 n.2 (citing 
People v. Wright, 45 Cal.3d 1126, 248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049 (1988); CALJIC 
2.92 (5th ed. 1996 Rev.). 
ldaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs testimony by experts. It states, "[ilf 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise." I.R.E. 702. In the present case, Mr. Wright asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it excluded Dr. Malpass's testimony because 
the court failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choice of 
whether to allow expert testimony. 
Dr. Malpass testified at the hearing on the motion in limine. He testified that he 
was a professor of psychology and criminal justice at the University of Texas El Paso, 
had a Ph.D from Veracruz University, and had "been researching this question and 
related aspects of it since 1969." (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-17.) He began publishing in the field 
of eyewitness identification in 1969 and his "most recent publication, a pair of 
publications, [was] an examination of the research literature and the thinking about 
sequential and simultaneous line-ups." (Tr., p.12, Ls.21-25.) He was on the editorial 
board of the Journal of Law and Human Behavior, "which is arguably the primary 
publication and primary journal in this field." (Tr., p.13, Ls.5-7.) He had worked with the 
Department of Justice on "the development of model procedures for eye witness 
identification" and had worked with the State of Illinois on an "evaluation program 
comparing simultaneous and sequential line-ups." (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-16.) He had 
previously testified in federal court and had testified in state courts in California, New 
Mexico, Texas, New York, Delaware, and Florida. (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-25.) 
In conducting experiments on eye witness identification, Dr. Malpass followed the 
"control procedures of scientific investigations," meaning "that different observers 
observing the same thing," using the "experimental method." (Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, 
L.13.) Dr. Malpass acknowledged that, "I can't see inside the witness's head," and that 
"I can talk in more general terms about the effect of various events. The jury as the 
finders of fact are in the unfortunate position, I think, of having to make decisions about 
what the person saw, how good of quality of information the witness probably had." 
(Tr., p.27, L.20-p.28, L.lO.) 
Dr. Malpass discussed a number of factors that can influence an eye witness 
identification. He testified that "the error rate would be 50 percent greater when viewing 
a cross-race identification rather than an own-race identification." (Tr., p.30, Ls.18-20.) 
Further, if a "subject's photograph is made available in the press . . . there will be an 
enhancement of the likelihood that the same person will be chosen at a subsequent 
identification procedure." (Tr., p.34, Ls.10-23.) "The presence of a weapon in the vision 
of the witness has an effect that decreases the accuracy of the verbal description of the 
offender . . ." (Tr., p.33, Ls.13-17.) Dr. Malpass testified that "confidence [in an 
identification] is easily manipulated" by witness feedback about the accuracy of the 
identification. (Tr., p.35, Ls.22-25.) 
The district court excluded Dr. Malpass's testimony. (R., p.160.) The court 
concluded that Dr. Malpass could not offer any opinions about particular witnesses in 
this case and that he limited his testimony by using terms such as "might indicate," 
"nossibly," and "could be" and admitted that there were few real studies of "actual eye 
wlti,ess identifications." (R., p.162.) Further, because many of the studies described by 
Dr. Malpass involved graduate students and were not conducted under circumstances 
involving "actual crime" the court questioned the reliability of the scientific principles 
upon which Dr. Malpass relied. (R., p.163.) The district court concluded that 
Dr. Malpass was no more qualified than the average juror to determine the credibility of 
a particular witness's testimony. (R., p.165.) The district court erred in coming to this 
conclusion. 
Dr. Malpass has been studying the reliability of eye witness identification since 
1969. While it is true that he spoke of "probabilities" and could not say for certain that 
any particular witness's identification was inaccurate, he could have informed the jury of 
the factors that, generally, impact an eye witness's accuracy, such as the presence of a 
weapon, the viewing of a subject's photograph in the press, feedback from the 
authorities, and the rate of inaccuracy that stems from a cross-racial identification. 
Further, the fact that he could not testify to a particular witness's identification did not 
warrant the exclusion of his testimony. Recently, in State v. Pearce, - I d a h o ,  
- P.3d , 2007 WL 15441521 (Ct. App. 2007) (not yet final), the Court of Appeals 
approved of the use of an expert witness regarding eyewitness identification. In Pearce, 
he district court expressed its concern that "any opinion Dr. Honts might offer 
concerning the particular witness identifications in this case, including, e.g., 
suggestibility or tainted memories, begins to tread into impermissible ground: the 
credibility of the witness identification, which is the absolute province of the jury as the 
finders of fact." 2007 WL at *5. The Court of Appeals concluded, "[tjhis reasoning, 
however, did not necessarily warrant such a broad exclusion of Dr. Honts's testimony. 
Such a rationale does not support disallowing Dr. Honts' testimony about 
procedures and problems associated with lineups and resulting identifications in 
the abstract." Id. "[Tlo testify as to general procedures, there is no requirement that 
the specialized knowledge of an expert witness include the facts of the case. Further, as 
stated in State v. Hopkins, 113 ldaho 679, 681, 747 P.2d 88, 90 (Ct. App. 1987), "[tlhe 
lack of direct experience is not fatal to [the proposed expert's] qualification but it may 
affect the weight given his testimony." Id. "Thus, the district court's reasoning 
concerning Dr. Honts's familiarity with the facts of the present case is largely irrelevant 
in regard to his testimony on eyewitness identifications generally ..." Id. Expert 
witnesses on eyewitness identification, therefore, need not be limited solely to the 
identification being made in a particular case; they may testify on the problems inherent 
in eyewitness identification in the abstract. 
Dr. Malpass was sufficiently qualified to testify about problems associated with 
eyewitness testimony. The district court abused its discretion when it refused to permit 
him to testify in Mr. Wright's defense in this case. 
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Give Mr. Wriaht's Reauested Jury 
Instruction Concerninq Eyewitness Identification 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wright asserts that the district court erred by failing to give his requested 
instruction on eyewitness identification. 
8. The District Court Erred When It Refused To Give Mr. Wriaht's Requested Jury 
Instruction Concernina Eyewitness Identification 
When reviewing jury instructions, an appellate court must first ask whether the 
instructions as a whole fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. State v. Row, 
131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998) (citing State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 
405, 807, P.2d 610, 623 (1991); State v. Bowman, 124 ldaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 
199 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
The appellate courts exercise free review when considering the propriety of jury 
instructions, and reversible error occurs when under the circumstances the instructions 
"have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party." State v. Young, 138 ldaho 
370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002); State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 
Mr. Wright offered the following instruction: 
Eyewitness testimony has been received in this trial for the purpose of 
identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. In 
determining the weight to be given eyewitness testimony, you should 
consider the believability of the eyewitness as well as other factors which 
bear upon the accuracy of the witness' identification of the defendant, 
including, but not limited to, any of the following: 
The opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged criminal act 
and the perpetrator of the act; 
The stress, if any, to which the witness was subjected at the time of 
the observation; 
The witness' ability, following the observation, to provide a 
description of the perpetrator of the act; 
The extent to which the defendant either fits or does not fit the 
description of the perpetrator previously given by the witness; 
The cross-racial nature of the identification; 
The witness' capacity to make an identification; 
Evidence relating to the witness' ability to identify other alleged 
perpetrators of the criminal act; 
Whether the witness was able to identify the alleged perpetrator in 
a photographic or physical lineup; 
The period of time between the alleged criminal act and the 
witness' identification; 
Whether the witness had prior contacts with the alleged perpetrator; 
The extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the 
identification; 
Whether the witness' identification is in fact the product of his own 
recollection; 
And any other evidence relating to the witness' ability to make an 
identification. 
(Defendant's Request For Additional Jury Instructions Regarding Eyewitness 
Identification.) The district court refused the instruction, informing counsel that counsel 
could simply argue the reliability of the eyewitness identification during closing 
arguments. (Tr., p.760, Ls.1-1 I .) The court erred by doing so because a criminal 
defendant is entitled to an instruction where there is a reasonable view of the evidence 
presented in the case that would support the instruction. State v. Eastman, 122 ldaho 
87,90, 831 P.2d 555, 558 (1992). 
The California Supreme Court has held, "a proper instruction on eyewitness 
identification factors should focus the jury's attention on facts relevant to its 
determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in 
a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence." People v. Wright, 
755 P.2d 1049, 1058 (Cal. 1988). The court held that such an instruction "should be 
given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no 
substantial corroborative evidence." Id. at 1059. This standard has been cited with 
approval in ldaho. See State v. Sanchez, 142 ldaho 309, 322 n.5, 127 P.3d 212, 225 
n.5 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Pacheco, 134 ldaho 367, 371 n.2, 2 P.3d 752, 756 n.2 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
In the instant case, identification was a crucial issue and there is no substantial 
corroborative evidence. While several witnesses place Mr. Wright with Mr. James and 
Mr. Gilmer at the scene of the incident, it is Kyle Russell, and Kyle Russell alone, who 
testified that he saw Mr. Wright shoot Mr. Gilmer. Mr. James did not testify that he saw 
Mr. Wright shoot Mr. Gilmer, and in any event, Mr. James is the individual who was 
seen running from the scene smelling like gunpowder, whose cousin had recently been 
killed by Mr. Gilmer's friend. Furthermore, the proposed instruction lists the relevant 
factors for the jury to consider and does so in a neutral manner. Considering this state 
of the evidence, Mr. Wright asserts that the district court erred by refusing to give this 
instruction to the jury. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Life, 
With Sixtv Years Fixed. For Second Dearee Murder 
A. Introduction . 
Mr. Wright asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
unified sentence of life, with sixty years fixed, because the court based its sentence on 
the finding that the murder was "cold-blooded" despite the fact that the jury found that 
the State had not proved premeditation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Life, With Sixty Years Fixed. For Second Dearee Murder 
Mr. Wright asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of life, 
with sixty years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing 
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an 
independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 
103 ldaho 771,653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[wlhere a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 
(1979)). Mr. Wright does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Wright must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401,405 (1991) (overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992))). The 
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; 
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 
of the ldaho Constitution prohibit sentences that constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. In State v. Brown, the ldaho Supreme Court recognized the proportionality 
test under the Eight Amendment. State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 
491 (1992). The Brown Court stated: 
We limit our proportionality analysis to death penalty cases and, under the 
ldaho Constitution as contemplated in State v. Evans, to those cases 
which are "out of proportion to the gravity of the offense committed" in the 
cruel and unusual punishment setting similar to the "grossly 
disproportionate" analysis of the eighth amendment urged by Justices 
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter in Harmelin. The lack of objective 
standards for evaluating differing terms of imprisonment, see Harmelin, 
11 1 S.Ct at 2704-05, gives proportionality review outside these two 
limited areas the potential of essentially allowing, if not requiring, this 
Court to second guess the trial court's discretionary determination of the 
criminal sentence that best fits the criminal defendant and the crime within 
the reasonable limits of the sentencing options. 
Brown, 121 ldaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. Therefore, the first step is to compare the 
crime committed and the sentence imposed to determine if the sentence leads to an 
inference of gross disproportionality. State v. Jensen, 138 ldaho 941, 946, 71 P.3d 
1088, 1093 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Mr. Wright must make such a showing in order to present his proportionality 
claim that the sentence that he received was disproportionate to the penalties imposed 
within the same jurisdiction for similar crimes. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
962, 1005 (1991). Once such a showing has been made, a comparative analysis of 
other sentences imposed in that jurisdiction may be relevant to validate the judgment 
that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 1005. 
When reviewing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, this Court only applies 
a proportionality analysis to those cases where the sentence imposed is "out of 
proportion to the gravity of the offense committed." State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 393- 
94, 825 P.2d 482, 490-91 (1992). The Court compares the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate. 
State v. Grazien, 144 ldaho 510, 517, 164 P.3d 790, 797 (2007). 
Here, the district court, in contravention of the findings of the jury, imposed a 
sentence based on the court's belief that the event was a "cold-blooded killing. It was a 
cold-blooded murder." (Tr., p.833, Ls.24-25.) This finding is in contravention of the 
jury's determination that Mr. Wright was only guilty of second degree murder and not 
first degree murder. (R., p.235.) 
The district court may not lawfully substitute its view for that of the jury. 
See State v. Menuin, 131 ldaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1 998) (improper for 
trial court to substitute its view of the facts for that of the jury where the finding of the 
jury is supported by substantial evidence). Cf. Schaefer v. Ready, 134 ldaho 378, 380, 
3 P.3d 56, 58 (Ct. App. 2000). In this case, the jury was instructed that, in order to find 
Mr. Wright guilty of first degree murder, they would have to find that the murder was a 
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." (Tr., p.767, Ls.18-19.) The court also 
explained that if the jury unanimously found that Mr. Wright was guilty of murder, but 
that the special circumstance of premeditation was not proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the jury was required to find that Mr. Wright was guilty of second degree murder. 
(Tr., p.768, Ls.3-8.) 
This Court generally presumes that the jury follows the instructions provided by 
the district court. See State v. Sanchez, 142 ldaho 309, 317, 127 P.3d 212, 220 
(Ct. App. 2005). In light of the verdict reached by the jury in this case of second degree 
murder, and the instructions provided by the district court, it is apparent that the jury 
considered and rejected the assertion that Mr. Wright acted with premeditation or 
deliberation. Moreover, it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact, in this case the 
jury, to determine what facts and circumstances sufficiently demonstrate a reasonable 
foundation from which to infer premeditation or deliberation. See State v. Johnson, 136 
ldaho 701, 704, 39 P.3d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Despite this finding by the jury, the district court at sentencing proceeded to treat 
Mr. Wright as though the jury had made the finding of premeditation or deliberation. 
The jury verdict unequivocally states that the jury found Mr. Wright not guilty of murder 
in the first degree. (R., p.150.) Because willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation was 
the single fact that distinguished between first degree and second degree murder in this 
case, the jury's finding precludes the district court from proceeding to treat Mr. Wright's 
case at sentencing as though he had been convicted of first degree murder. 
First degree murder is a more serious offense than second degree murder. 
I.C. § 18-4004. In the context of a homicide, the generally understood definition of "cold 
blooded" is "a killer's state of mind when committing a willful and premeditated 
homicide." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (8th ed. 2004). The district court's statements 
regarding Mr. Wright acting intentionally and "cold-bloodedly" effectively ignored the 
jury's verdict that Mr. Wright did not commit first degree murder, supplanted its view of 
the evidence for that of the jury, and treated Mr. Wright's case at sentencing as though 
he was being sentenced for the offense of first degree murder rather than second 
degree murder. On this basis, the sentence imposed by the district court was not 
proportionate to the less serious offense of which he was convicted. 
While Mr. Wright does have a criminal history, it consists mostly of juvenile 
offenses. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-15.) Mr. Wright's 
mother wrote a letter to the presentence investigator, stating, "many of Michael's 
charges as a juvenile were because I turned him in to his probation officer. If he 
decided to stay overnight at someone's house and did not tell me, I would file runaway 
charges on him. He never officially ran away." (PSI, p.18.) His only prior felony 
conviction was for grand theft. (PSI, p.14.) 
Further, Mr. Wright still had significant family support. His mother wrote that she 
would be attending sentencing and that Mr. Wright was "so young and wants to raise his 
son to be a good boy and a fine, upstanding man. I cannot fathom how this baby will 
grow up without his father. I saw the struggles that my sons went through without their 
father, and it breaks my heart." (PSI, p.19.) Mr. Wright was adopted and his adoptive 
father was arrested for sexually abusing four women at the hospital where he worked. 
(PSI, p.18.) He served over six years for the offense. (PSI, p.18.) Mr. Wright's family 
became homeless; "Michael took it all very hard and started acting up when he was an 
adolescent." (PSI, p.18.) 
Mr. Wright's mother wrote that Mr. Wright had tried to reach out to his brothers to 
help them grow up "since my ex-husband takes no interest in our sons." (PSI, p.19.) 
She stated that Mr. Wright was "wonderful around children ... and especially his son. He 
is loving, gentle, playful, and helpful. He loves to teach his son new things and so want 
to be with him always." (PSI, p.19.) Considering the seriousness of the crime, counsel 
for Mr. Wright requested a sentence of life, with twenty years fixed. (Tr., p.832, Ls.23- 
25.) "That gives him an incentive to do the best while he is in penitentiary and while 
ruminating on what happened that night." (Tr., p.833, Ls.6-8.) 
Considering this information, Mr. Wright submits that the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of life, with sixty years fixed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wright requests that his conviction for second degree murder be vacated and 
his case remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand the case for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2008. 
~ep'uty St e Appellate Public Defender 
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